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Margaret Movshin Criscuola 
Originality, Realism and Morality: 
Three Issues in Sir Walter Scott's 
Criticism of Fiction 
loan Williams, in his admirable edition of Sir Walter Scott on 
Novelists and Fiction,l has done readers of Scott a great ser-
vice. Scott's prefaces to Ballantyne's Novelist's Library, 
later published separately as The Lives of the Novelists~ and 
the best of his reviews of contemporary tales, now may be puz-
zled through in convenience. This reader has become convinced 
in the process that Scott had a more consistent theory of fic-
tion than he is usually given credit for, perhaps because it 
is more closely related to the thought of his Enlightenment 
predecessors than to that of his Romantic contemporaries. The 
aim of this paper is to tease out of Scott's multifarious 
criticism some of its underlying assumptions. 
The enterprise may seem quixotic, for although Scott's 
critical judgment is frequently praised, its good qualities 
are traced generally to a temperamental rather than an intel-
lectual origin, and so placed beyond our analysis or emula-
tion. Williams dubs Sir Walter "a practical rather than a 
theoretical critic,,,2 and concludes that "temperamental in-
adequacy ••• prevented him, in spite of his capacity to perceive 
the practical aspects of a work of art, from making any major 
advance in the theory of the novel" (Williams, p. 6). Marga-
ret Ball covered in her study of Sir Walter Scott as a Critic 
of Literature 3 the wide range of Scott's work as editor and 
biographer of Swift and Dryden, folklorist, and critic of po-
etry as well as of fiction, but made no attempt to test its 
logical coherence. John Lauber, noting that Scott's criticism 
of novels "surpasses, in both quantity and importance, the 
work of any previous or contemporary critic of fiction,tll! 
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points out the difficulties Scott's statements raise in his 
seemingly philistine value for novelty, separation of plot 
and character, weakness in dealing with technique, and rejec-
tion of the moral importance of the novel. Still it seems 
worthwhile to seek the principles, unformalized as they are, 
behind the "balance and moderation" (Williams, p. 11), "large 
fresh sanity,"S "flexible ••• application of catholic ••• taste, 
qualities rare in the partisan and dogmatic periodical criti-
cism of the time,,,5 and too rare at any time not to have had 
some foundation in theory. Besides, the work of Duncan Forbes 7 
on Scott's intellectual antecedents in the school of the Scot-
tish Enlightenment suggests new sources of analogous theory 
to assist this investigation. And in Scott's criticism (bar-
ring his comments in prefaces to the Waverley Novels, spoken 
"according to the trick" and unreliable for present purposes) 
we do find recurring terms which mark central issues. Origi-
nality and variety; human nature, romance, and novel; and 
morality: Scott returns to these again and again. 
Let us begin as Scott usually does with originality--a 
"rare and valuable property" (Williams, p. 77) which he sel-
dom fails to assess in the novelists who come under his scru-
tiny. He grants it to Henry McKenzie because "the sources to 
which he resorts to excite our interest are rendered accessi-
ble by a path peculiarly his own" (Williams, p. 77); that is, 
he attains the "pathetic effect" he shares with Richardson and 
Sterne by a new method: "the reader's sympathy is excited by 
the effect produced on one [character] of the drama," rather 
than by Richardson's "combination of minutely traced events" 
or Sterne's "wild, fanciful, beautiful flight of thought and 
expression" (Williams, p. 78). The pursuit of new effects is 
also original; for Ann Radcliffe invents a new "species of 
romance" by "an appeal. •• to the passion of fear, whether ex-
cited by natural dangers,or by the suggestions of supersti-
tion" nUlliams, p. 110). In these and other such comments, 
form appears as the first measure of originality, and Scott 
speaks of a novelist's originality much as he did of Swift's: 
There was indeed nothing before his time which 
could serve for his model, and the few hints 
which he has adopted from other writers bear no 
more resemblance to his compositions than the 
green flax to the cable which is formed from it. S 
Scott frankly couples originality with providing a formal model 
to later authors when he describes Walpole's Castle of Otran-
to as "the original and model of a peculiar species of compo-
sition" (Williams, p. 87) and refers testily to Mrs. Radcliffe's 
many imitators (Williams, p. 111). 
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Scott equated originality with the invention of a new "spe-
cies" or "style" or "variety"--the terms are used synonymously 
--of composition. Williams has noted that Scott was "remark-
ably free in his approach to work of 'kinds' which would or 
would not have been recognized by earlier and more schematic 
critics" (Williams. p. 17). Scott had good reason to welcome 
new species of prose fiction; it was obviously a new and ra-
pidly growing genre in which he himself was a leading inno-
vator. The publication of Ballantyne's Novelist's Library it-
self may be seen as an attempt to preserve examples of pecu-
liar kinds of fiction as a record of the growth of the genre. 
Scott's enthusiasm for new varieties may also have had a more 
strictly theoretical basis; at least. it strongly resembles 
the ideas of Alexander Gerard's Essay on Genius which appeared 
the year before Scott's birth. Gerard. following Hume's asso-
ciative psychology. held that the characteristic quality of 
genius was invention or originality, which is to be seen not 
in perfection of work, but in the creation of "some new work, 
different from those of his predecessors, though not perhaps 
excelling them •••• "9 Scott agrees with Gerard in finding the 
introduction of a new literary kind the true yardstick by 
which to measure genius. 
Scott shows his interest in new species of fiction in three 
distinct ways. First, he believes a critic must understand 
the kind of a work, even when the work is first of its kind, 
to evaluate it fairly. Defending Ann Radcliffe's Gothic ro-
mance, he attacks the criticism· 
which would undermine the fair name of an accom-
plished writer, by showing that she does not 
possess the excellence proper to a style of com-
position totally different from that which she 
has attempted. The question is neither, whether 
the romances of Mrs. Radcliffe possess merits 
which her plan did not require, nay, almost 
excluded; nor whether hers is to be considered 
as a department of fictitious composition, equal 
in dignity and importance to those where the great 
ancient masters have long pre-occupied the ground. 
The real and only point is, whether. considered as 
a separate and distinct species of writing, that 
introduced by Mrs. Radcliffe possesses merit, and 
affords pleasure •••• (Williams. p. 112) 
This statement stands in firm opposition to criticism by pre-
established kinds. Scott's practice is to deduce from the 
works he inspects their general aims and methods and to use 
these as standards for judging all aspects of the works--a 
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delicate procedure which any 'new Critic' can appreciate. 
Aware of her purpose after candid reading, he can praise the 
way Radcliffe's "materials ••• and the means employed in con-
ducting the narrative. are all selected with a view to the 
author's primary object" (Williams, p. 114). He can even de-
tect elements which mar the effect, such as the author's own 
"rule .•. that all the circumstances of her narrative, however 
mysterious. and apparently superhuman, were to be accounted 
for on natural principles, at the winding up of the story" 
(Williams, p. 115). Previously accepted norms and even inju-
dicious standards erected by the author should, Scott believes, 
give way to the attainment of an effect upon the reader. 
Since each kind has its own effect, the proliferation of 
kinds represents an enlarging of readers' possibilities; thus 
the genre becomes adapted to the tastes of more and more di-
verse readers. Scott judges Radcliffe's works ultimately on 
whether they "afford pleasure." and in the same spirit he ac-
cepts their unconventionality because "the infinite variety of 
human tastes requires different styles of composition for their 
gratification" (Williams, p. 112; cf. pp. 77 and 124). Here 
is no single human nature, no ideal reader, but instead many 
ordinary mortals who are to enjoy the works the critic dis-
cusses, and whose actual experience is far more important than 
his judgments. The critic's task is to see what is there, to 
point out, for instance, the gloomy tone of Charlotte Smith's 
works, realizing that it "may be a reconnnendation, or the con-
trary, as it affects readers of various temperaments, or the 
same reader in a different mood of mind" (Williams, p. 188). 
Behind this "practical" acceptance of the diversity of readers 
lies a Humean belief in connnon mental processes diversified by 
particular experiences, which enable people to share in great 
works of universal appeal and also to enjoy peculiar literary 
experiences without being necessarily corrupt or degenerate. 
The second form of Scott's interest in variety is an appre-
ciation of diversity for its own sake. He states: 
We ••• behold, that not only each star differs from 
another in glory, but that there is spread over the 
face of Nature a boundless variety; and that as a 
thousand different kinds of shrubs and flowers, not 
only have beauties independent of each other, but 
are more delightful from that very circumstance 
than if they were uniform, so the fields of litera-
ture admit the same variety ••.• (Williams. p. 112) 
Nowhere does Scott differ more from modern critics than in 
this love of variety. It leads him to what would now be con-
sidered a preposterous comparison of Smollett with Fielding, 
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in which Fielding's "superior taste" is balanced or even out-
weighed by the "more inexhaustible richness of invention" of 
Smollett: 
In comparison with his sphere, that in which 
Fielding walked was limited, and compared with 
the wealthy profusion of varied character and 
incident which Smollett has scattered through 
his works, there is a poverty of composition 
about his rival. (Williams, p. 66) 
Here again Scott seconds Gerard, who found "comprehensiveness 
of imagination" the first quality of genius, so that a "work 
of real genius always proclaims ••• that immense quantities of 
materials have been collected by fancy, and subjected to the 
author's choice."IO 
Thirdly, Scott as an historian of prose fiction evidently 
saw in diversity a principle of growth. He does not describe 
the novel's history as a gradual discovery of a single set of 
formal possibilities, although he traces the methods of indi-
vidual authors back to their origins, noting LeSage's debt to 
Cervantes (Williams, p. 120), Smollett's to LeSage (Williams, 
p. 57), and Jane Austen's rich inheritance from their school 
of realism (Williams, p. 230). Instead, his overviews of the 
genre most frequently take the form of classifications. For 
instance, in a review of works of E. T. A. Hoffman, Scott 
categorizes the uses of the supernatural in fiction, differ-
entiating among a variety of authors' peculiar effects, and 
displaying the original points of each. Throughout the Lives 
of the Novelists, Scott sees the work of his eighteenth-cen-
tury forebears as a host of inventions, great and small, some 
incompatible with others, but all comprising a range of possi-
bilities wider and richer than a single form could offer. The 
social thought of the Scottish moralists was dominated by the 
idea of social progress through an ever-increasing speciali-
zation and division of labor.II Scott has brought a similar 
idea into the discussion of literature: the genre grows by 
diversifying. 
Originality and variety--the terms seem to lead Scott's 
criticism toward complete relativism and confusion. They are, 
however, tied to another which Scott can invoke as a standard; 
for he links true originality and invention with a "knowledge 
of the human heart" or of "human nature," with "the accurate 
power of examining and embodying human character and human 
passion, as well as the external face of nature" (Williams, 
p. 67). What this knowledge may be we will consider in a 
moment. First it is important to note Scott's conviction that 
it resulted from the work of intellect, not from feeling or 
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intuition. He makes this point firmly and fully in his ac-
count of Dryden's genius, which he saw distinguished by "the 
power of reasoning, and of expressing the result in appropri-
ate language.,,12 Scott held that 
This power of ratiocination, of investigating, 
discovering, and appreciating that which is 
really excellent, if accompanied with the neces-
sary command of fanciful illustration, and ele-
gant expression, is the most interesting quality 
which can be possessed by a poet. 13 
Expression and illustration are merely "extrinsic qualities" 
of poetry; the "vivifying spirit" by which readers are affec-
ted is sup~lied by the intellectual "powers of observation and 
deduction" 4 of the poet, which are exactly identical to "the 
talents that led Bacon into the recesses of ~hilosophy, and 
conducted Newton to the cabinet of Nature."l Alexander Ger-
ard, too, found no difference in kind between the faculty "for 
producing original works of art" and that "for making new dis-
coveries in science •••• "16 By the time the Life of Dryden was 
published, Lockhart's notes to a later edition show, this idea 
had become to an English reviewer at least, quite incompre-hensible;l~ yet Scott pronounces it unhesitatingly and matter-
of-factly. And this conception of poetic power as the power 
of reasoning from observation helps us make sense of Scott's 
otherwise bewildering liberality in the matter of "human na-
ture." 
Scott considered the most diverse fictions as revealing 
knowledge of humanity, and the knowledge assumes as many forms 
as there were forms of fiction. Richardson was "a cautious, 
deep, and minute examinator of the human heart," (Williams, 
p. 40) as were Sterne and Mackenzie; Fielding achieved "the 
extended familiarity with the English character, in every rank 
and aspect, which has made his name immortal as a painter of 
national manners" (Williams, p. 46); Smollett understood pro-
fessional character, and was also "a searcher of dark bosoms" 
(Williams, p. 67). Robert Bage and Mary Shelley explore hu-
man thought; John Galt and William Godwin delve into super-
stition and extraordinary mental states and so create the 
"novel of character" (Williams, p. 299). Even works such as 
Walpole's Castle of Otranto which employ supernatural machin-
ery may still provide an "accurate display of human character" 
(Williams, p. 85). And reviewing his own Old Mortality and 
The Black Dwarf, the Author of Waverley finds that their "de-
lineation of the manners and characters" of past times, and 
"faithful representation of general nature" earn their author 
a place "on the bench of the historians of his time and coun-
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try" (Williams, p. 256). In fact, the many kinds of "know-
ledge of human nature" which Scott found in the fiction he 
reviewed, and which we would now classify as psychology, so-
cial psychology, sociology, and ethics, in his day formed the 
single study of "moral philosophy." Scott took seriously the 
idea that fiction could contribute to this large area of study; 
indeed, in his comments the value of these works of literature 
seems at times in greater danger of being overlooked than their 
interest as investigations of human life. 
We have now reached a much-debated issue in Scott's criti-
cism and fiction--that of the novel (or realism) and romance. 
These are the only critical terms for which Scott gives formal 
definitions: Romance is "fictitious narrative in prose or 
verse; the interest of which turns upon marvellous and uncom-
mon incidents;" Novel is "fictitious narrative, differing from 
the Romance, because the events are accommodated to the ordin-
ary train of human events, and the modern state of society."18 
Yet these are not distinct terms as Scott uses them. Richard-
son, for instance, is said to have broken from romance, tear-
ing "from his personages those painted vizards, which con-
cealed, under a clumsy and affected disguise, every thing like 
the natural lineaments of the human countenance" '(Williams, 
p. 22). Still, his works are "but a step from the old romance 
••• still dealing in improbable incidents, and in characters 
swelled out beyond the ordinary limits of humanity" (Williams, 
p. 52). Fielding and Smollett offer more complete examples of 
the "minor-romance, or English novel" (Williams, p. 57), at 
least until Jane Austen achieves the full potential of the 
novelist's art, "keeping close to common incident, and to such 
characters as occupy the ordinary walks of life" (Williams, 
p. 231). The investigation of human nature lies in the pro-
vince of the novel, not the romance. But clearly, romance and 
novel are historical terms for Scott, and achieve meaning only 
in the light of new inventions in fiction. The inventions he 
inspects in The LiVes of the Novelists, moreover, include not 
only the realistic novel, but also new kinds of romance and 
new accommodations between the two types. 
A scholarly article on Romance for the Encyclopedia Britan-
nioa shows Scott's mature views on romance. He recounts its 
history as a progress from historical tradition, which in "a 
very few generations"19 loses its accuracy to marvellous addi-
tions, through the naive tale which embodies the fashions of 
its times without the author's conscious intent,20 to a more 
sophisticated form, "written for a more advanced stage of so-
ciety" which "demanded, at the hand of those who professed to 
entertain them, some insight into nature, or at least into 
manners ••.• "21 The novel's scrutiny of common life and char-
acter is the furthest point of this progress. 
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Yet throughout this history of realism a second force is 
acting--a countervailing taste for incident, suspense, and ex-
citement, the "love of the marvellous, so natural to the human 
mind •••• "22 Scott quotes with approval Southey's conclusions 
about the universality of this taste: 
••• man has his intellectual as well as his bodily 
appetites, and these things are the food of his 
imagination and faith. They are found wherever 
there is language and discourse of reason, in other 
words, wherever there is man. And in similar stages 
of civilization, or states of society, the fiction 
of different people will bear a corresponding re-
semblance, notwithstanding the difference of time 
and scene. 23 
Scott gradually came to believe that even specific plot-lines 
--for instance, that of the king in disguise who exchanges a 
pledge with a subject--may have universal appea1.2~ Of this 
he was certain: that romance of all forms relied for its ac-
ceptance on an intrinsic "universal charm of narrative" (Wil-
liams, p. 226). Incident artfully combined, however inher-
ently improbable, appeals to a reader's imagination and anti-
cipation with the "and then" movement E. M. Forster describes 
so witti1y.25 So romance is general in interest, always amus-
ing--and never instructive. 
Some fictions put the appeal of romance to the service of 
the discovery of human nature. Swift's Gulliver's Travels and 
Johnson's Rasselas which modern critics hold to be openly 
didactic ana1ogues26 rather than novels, and Mary Shelley's 
Frankenstein all aim "less to produce an effect by means of 
the marvels of the narrations, than to open new trains and 
channels of thought" (Williams, p. 261). These works "sup-
pose the existence of the most extravagant fictions, in order 
to extract from them philosophical reasoning and moral truth" 
(Williams, p. 326). The reader suspends disbelief and "grants, 
for the time of perusal, the premises on which the fable de-
pends" (Williams, p. 90); in return, the author provides him 
with the same knowledge of humanity to be found in works of 
more realistic method. The Voyage to Brobdingnag, for in-
stance, "exhibits human actions and sentiments as they might 
appear" to giants (Williams, p. 147); that to the Houyhnhnms 
shows man "such as he may be found in the degraded ranks of 
every society, when brutalized by ignorance and gross vice" 
(Williams, p. 150). Robinson Crusoe on his imaginary island 
becomes 
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an example of what the unassisted energies of an 
individual of the human race can perform ••• acting 
and thinking precisely as such a man must have 
thought and acted in such an extraordinary situ-
ation. (Williams, p. 180) 
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Only to John Bunyan and Edmund Spenser does Scott ascribe 
downright allegory and the presentation of a moral truth dis-
tinct from factual observation of one of the many aspects of 
human nature. 
Romance is uninstructive usually because it sacrifices 
character to incident; its characters cannot be expanded and 
individualized without disarranging the neat vicissitudes of 
plot. In Radcliffe's romances, for example, "our curiosity is 
too much interested about the evolution of the story to permit 
our feelings to be acted upon by the distresses of the hero or 
heroine. ,,2.7 Contrariwise, Scott finds that his own plots suf-
fer precisely when he creates his most successful characters 
(Williams, p. 457). Dryden, when unable to use the "bold and 
impetuous characters he delighted to draw,,,28 fell back on 
"generic representation[s] of •.• certain c1ass[es] of men or 
women,,,2.9 and in place of "moral and sentimental passion," of 
which he knew little, substituted "the absurd, unnatural, and 
fictitious refinements of romance.,,30 Scott assumes here that 
romance, the customary, even universal, turns of plot, will 
occur to all writers in distress. Gerard, too, expects such 
lapses from originality; when the principles of imagination 
are weak, 
they will call in memory to their aid. Unable to 
guide our steps in an unknown country they keep 
in the roads to which they have been accustomed; 
and are directed in suggesting ideas, by the con-
nexions which we remember. 31 
Originality as Scott and Gerard conceive it presupposes a 
crude base of conventional assumptions and forms from which 
the new arises and is distinguished. For Scott, this base is 
romance. 
So Scott watches with interest as Maturin outgrows romance 
in favor of his own more valuable "feeling and conception of 
character," and attempts 
a different and more interesting model, pretending 
to the merit of describing the emotions of the human 
heart, rather than that of astonishing the reader by 
the accumulation of imaginary horrors, or the singu-
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1ar combinations of marvellous and perilous adven-
tures • (Williams, p. 273) 
Burke's sublime, which acts upon the reader so powerfully by 
curiosity and terror, is not for Scott the noblest literary 
effect. Works which attempt no intellectual discovery, those 
like Mrs. Radcliffe's which display neither "the command of 
the human passions, nor the insight into the human heart, nor 
the observation of life and manners, which recommend other 
authors in the same line" (Williams, p. 119), are only amuse-
ments, distractions. Scott defends them in these terms: 
Perhaps the perusal of such works may, without in-
justice, be compared with the use of opiates, bane-
ful, when habitually and constantly resorted to, 
but of most blessed power in those moments of pain 
and of 1angour, when the whole head is sore, and 
the whole heart sick. (Williams, p. 105) 
The defense is harsher than many attacks. 
The novel is a very different fi.ctional p.ossibility. First, 
though the chief charm of romance lies in the tricks and turns 
of plot, fiction can dispense with this "added beauty" (Wil-
liams, p. 52). Scott weighs its value thus: 
few of the merits which a novel usually boasts are 
to be preferred to an interesting and well-arranged 
story. But then this merit, however great, has 
never been considered as indispensable to ficti-
tious narrative. On the contrary, in many of the 
best specimens of that class of composition--Gil 
Blas, for example, Peregrine Pickle~ Roderick 
Random, and many others of the first eminence--
no effort whatever is made to attain the praise 
belonging to a compact system of adventures •••• 
(Williams, pp. 187-8) 
Again and again Scott asks, "What is the use of the plot but 
to bring in fine things?" (Williams, p. 188; also pp. 239, 
454) Incidents in a novel may resemble pearls in a strand 
(Williams, p. 188), or "the pictures in a showman's box" 
(Williams, p. 172; also p. 239), and be merely strung toge-
ther. In Scott's estimation, the plot of Emma is "extricated 
with great simplicity" upon a "simple plan" (Williams, p. 234), 
for its "train of mistakes and embarrassing situations, and 
dialogues at balls and parties of pleasure" (Williams, p .234) 
carries no intrinsic interest as events. It brings in fine 
things: Austen's "peculiar powers of humour and knowledge of 
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human life" (Williams, p. 234). This novelist has abjured the 
genuine though conventional effects of romance plotting and 
characterization, 
neither alarming our credulity nor amusing our 
imagination by wild variety of incident, or by 
those pictures of romantic affection and sensi-
bility, which were formerly as certain attributes 
of fictitious characters as they are of rare oc-
currence among those who actually live and die. 
(Williams, p. 230) 
Instead, Austen has chosen "the art of copying from nature as 
she really exists in the common walks of life, and presenting 
to the reader ••• a correct and striking representation of that 
which is daily taking place around him" (Williams, p. 230). 
For Scott the art of copying from nature, in Austen's work 
and that of other novelists, is the creation of characters 
securely placed in a general scheme and also particularized by 
exceptional details so as to appeal as individuals. Scott 
praises his own ability to "separate those traits which are 
characteristic from those that are generic" and so to repre-
sent both "the manners of the times" and "individuals as they 
thought and spoke and acted" (Williams, pp. 256-7). Smollett, 
analyzing character by profession, has "diversified" his "sea-
Characters," "distinguishing the individual features of each 
honest tar, while each possesses a full proportion of profes-
sional manners and habits of thinking" so that "we at once ac-
knowledge them as distinct persons, while we see and allow 
that everyone of them belongs to the old English navy" (Wil-
liams, p. 68). Such characters are even historically informa-
tive (Williams, p. 68). And they are interesting: Smollett's 
particularized evil-doer, Ferdinand Count Fathom, "is a living 
and existing miscreant from whom we shrink," while Fielding's 
Jonathan Wild, "a cold personification of the abstract princi-
ple of eVil," becomes "absolutely tiresome" as a character 
(Williams, p. 67). General characters may have "truth and 
force" (Williams, p. 188) and may be positively informative, 
as Richard Cumberland's "generic" sailors, Spaniards, Jews and 
Quakers are (Williams, p. 215); but they evince their authors' 
"power[s] of ratiocination" without the "command of fanciful 
illustration"S2 which should embody the fruit of observation. 
Individualizing, "unless the author is powerfully gifted with 
the inventive faculty, is more likely to produce monsters than 
models of composition" (Williams, p. 188). 
Particularization and generalization were the subjects of 
much Enlightenment aesthetic debate. Reynolds in the Dis-
courses urges the artist to "look only on those general habits 
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which are every where and always the same,"33 and "not to run 
into particularities.,,34 The generalizing "great style" has 
an offshoot, "original or characteristical style,,,35 marked by 
peculiarities of the artist's own temperament, such as Salva-
tor Rosa's works, of a "rude and wild character,,35 which Scott 
likened to the romances of Mrs. Radcliffe (Williams, p. 109). 
Reynolds reluctantly recognized a third style, that of the 
Dutch painters who show "their own people engaged in their own 
peculiar occupations" and "exhibit all the minute particulari-
ties of a nation differing •.. from the rest of mankind." 37 
Scott compares Jane Austen's novels to Flemish painting (Wil-
liama, p. 285). Reynolds evidently considers the three styles 
as distinct alternatives; but the Scots thinkers Alexander 
Gerard and James Beattie reconcile them much as Scott does. 
Gerard holds that the genius draws his generalizations from 
experience and embodies them in particularized creations in a 
single imaginative act. 38 Beattie, his follower, distingui-
shes them as complementary processes, generalization being the 
foundation and individualization the completion of the ar-
tist's work: "Homer's heroes are all valiant, yet each dis-
plays a modification of valour peculiar to himself," and the 
great poet lets us "know every particular that can be known" 39 
about them. Scott's acceptance of both particular and general 
characters, and his preference for the former, appears very 
similar to Beattie's, based on an idea of the poetic process 
as observation, deduction, and illustration of the deductive 
categories in unique examples. The apparent contradictions 
of Scott's strictures on characterization thus dissolve into 
an orderly theory of representation. 
Characterization is for Scott verity; verisimilitude is a 
mimicking in the narrative texture of the artist's process of 
thought. We may see this in Scott's descriptions of two basic 
techniques of verisimilitude. The first is detai1--"circum-
stantial detail of minute, trivial, and even uninteresting 
circumstances" (Williams, p. 42)--which disguises fiction as 
real, imprecise and subjective observation. This is so because 
small and detached facts form the foreground of 
a narrative when told by an eyewitness •.• just as 
a musket-shot, passing near the head of a soldier, 
makes a deeper impression on his mind, than all 
the heavy ordnance which has been discharged through-
out the engagement. (Williams, p. 154) 
The narrative, in short, takes the shape of the associative 
principles of a single mind. Thus Richardson's prolixity 
(Williams, p. 43) and Defoe's "deficiencies of style" (Wil-
liams, p. 173) may become assets, suggesting the foibles of 
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real story-tellers. The careful knitting of incidents and 
characters may even detract from verisimilitude (Williams, 
p. l80)! 
41 
Detail, in this view, produces verisimilitude by setting up 
a point-by-point comparison between the fiction and the read-
er's own methods of observation. A narrative persona, repre-
senting ordinary people's habits of speech and thought, not 
only provides a study in psychology, but also vouches for the 
truth of the rest of the tale. Itstruth--as what? Obviously 
not as a logical exploration of potentialities, but as genuine 
observation, unavoidably complex and partial. Neat plotting 
and authorial control would reduce this complexity--so Scott 
is willing to sacrifice them to what he believes is a leading 
truth of human life. We see in his joy in variety the same 
belief: that the world is too rich for anyone mind to order, 
or anyone literary form to limn. 
Scott recognizes that the unity of the story suffers from 
the detail necessary for verisimilitude, so to repair the dam-
age he suggests the dramatic method of narrative. 40 The read-
er takes the place of observer (filled by the persona of 
earlier fiction) and is "compelled to gather the meaning of 
the scene from what the dramatis personae say to each other" 
without authorial explanation (Williams, p. 239). The "char-
acters ••• evolve themselves with dramatic effect," and the 
scope for "minute detail" might be too wide (Williams, p. 235). 
Unfortunately, however, the narrative is broken down into a 
series of scenes, giving it "flimsiness and incoherent tex-
ture" (Williams, p. 239), while the protagonist has his fate 
"uniformly determined by the agency of the subordinate per-
sons" "evolving themselves" free from demands of plot (Wil-
liams, p. 240). Scott's experimentation in his own novels 
and comments on them show that he never solved, to his own 
satisfaction, the formal problem of presenting convincing de-
tail within an organized plot. 
The second technique of verisimilitude Scott describes in-
stitutes a comparison between the author's and reader's powers 
of generalization: the reader is won over to the author's 
premises because they are internally consistent, or propor-
tional. James Beattie showed that internal consistency lends 
probability to the marvellous, that Swift's Lilliputians "may 
pass for probable beings" because "every circumstance relating 
to them accords with itself, and with their supposed charac-
ter."41 Scott's comments on Gulliver's Travels (Williams, 
pp. 152, 160, 163) follow Beattie's closely, and he adds the 
general rule that "proportion forms an essential attribute of 
truth, and consequently of verisimilitude, or that which ren-
ders a narration probable" (Williams, p. 152). This statement 
strains the distinction between verisimilitude and accurate 
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representation. Swift's fantasy achieves psychological accu-
racy, for Gulliver and his hosts "conduct themselves towards 
each other precisely as must necessarily have happened" in 
reality (Williams, p. 152). Moreover, manipulation of propor-
tion sets vice in its true light, "political intrigue ••• ridi-
culed by being transferred to a court of creatures about six 
inches high," and "female levities, and ••• lighter follies ••• 
rendered monstrous and disgusting" by being drawn on a giant 
scale (Williams, p. 152). Shakespeare's supernatural beings 
hover near factuality, gifted with "such attributes as all 
readers •.• recognized as those which must have corresponded to 
such extraordinary beings" (Williams, p. 97). After all, the 
two techniques of verisimilitude are merely applications to 
the conduct of narrative of the principles of thought, fact-
gathering and class-building, which establish truth when exer-
cised on reality. 
Much of Scott's criticism of the novel is directed toward 
the process by which it achieves or apes intellectual dis-
covery. When a work of fiction instructs by different means, 
Scott is at a loss. Swift, for example, sets up clashes be-
tween what Scott would call the generic and the individual, 
between narrative proportion and detail, with his Houyhnhnms 
threading needles and Gulliver pleading innocent to enjoying 
a Lilliputian lady. Such clashes Scott sees only as errors 
(Williams, p. 163). Swift, writing a determined attack on 
modern thought, aims to baffle his reader's rational quest for 
knowledge and chasten his faith in scientific method; Scott is 
left searching the Travels for 'straight' representations of 
human behavior. He is inadequate as a reader of Swift's i rony42 
because he is an inveterate modern, relying on generalization 
and particularization as complementary--not contradictory. 
One element of fiction is free of intellectual demands. 
Scott, we have seen, credits romance only with aesthetic ef-
fect, and ignores the question of how romantic plotting or 
marvellous postulates work in essentially novelistic tales. 
In practice, he does not regard most novels as unified wholes, 
and adopts different c~iteria to talk about the two kinds of 
fiction. The position seems arbitrary, yet we will suggest a 
principle behind it. Hume, in defining the limits of ascer-
tainable knowledge, discarded knowledge of causation, arguing 
that the causal connection was based on habit and, though use-
ful in daily life, was not provable or logically warranted. 43 
Scott may view romance, story, or causal structure as a mental 
construct analogous to a theory of causation, and so value it 
for its practical aid and effect on passions and emotions, yet 
reject it as a contribution to the search for truth. Certain-
ly, the fiction Scctt studied readily tolerated inconsisten-
cies in plot: the monstrous accumulation of children and 
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lovers in Moll Flanders, for instance, will never do as a uni-
fied significant action; and the elaborate causal structure 
of Tom Jones is presented with such arch playfulness that 
thoughtful readers may prefer to follow it as a rhetorical 
structure rather than a serious causal explanation. 44 In this 
regard Scott is a naive critic, gazing through the lens of 
fiction as if it were air, never inquiring how it distorts 
what lies on the other side, and never examining the arranged 
nature of the whole tableau. The means by which to do these 
~~ere as yet undiscovered. We, however, in possession of these 
1I'.eans, should not let them distract us entirely from an impor-
tant aim of eighteenth-century fiction--and of Scott's fic-
tion--the delineation not of a unified action but of the mul-
tifarious transactions of ordinary life to introduce the read-
er to a complex social world. 
Finally we are ready to take up the problem of the moral 
influence of fiction. Scott's statements on this issue, too, 
seem contradictory at first; he joins his contemporaries in 
weighing tales as moral instruction, but he concludes by laugh-
ing down the idea that representations of immoral acts will 
harm readers. First, in a defense of Pamela, he excludes the 
moral resulting merely from plot: 
The direct and obvious moral to the deduced from 
a fictitious narrative, is of much less conse-
quence to the public than the mode in which the 
story is treated in the course of details. If 
the author introduces scenes which excite evil 
passions, if he familiarizes the mind of the 
readers [sic] with impure ideas, or sophisticates 
their understanding with false views of morality, 
it will be an unavailing defence, that, in the 
end of his book, he has represented virtue as 
triumphant. (Williams, p. 23; cf. p. 54) 
To "excite passions" belongs to romance; Scott leaves the 
pornographer's use of the marvellous to the mercy of the cen-
sors. Richardson's plot can be ignored, and his realistic 
mode results in a study of innocent Pamela to which the char-
acter of lustful Mr. B- is merely an adjunct (Williams, p. 23). 
Fielding too is saved by his realism, acquitted not because 
Jones suffers for his sins, but because his author paints 
"life as it is, with all its shades, and more than all the 
lights which it occasionally exhibits, to relieve them" (Wil-
liams, p. 55). These comments tend to demand representations 
not completely taken up with the dark side of life; for Smol-
lett's Ferdinand Count Fathom is such a "complete picture of 
human depravity" that virtuous readers find him a "disgusting 
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pollution of the imagination." while the vicious may adopt 
him as an instructive example (Williams. p. 60). Even so, 
Scott does not argue that the portrait will corrupt the inno-
cent. Instead, it is distasteful. as other delineations of 
low life may be by which a reader "may be amused" yet feels 
that he is slumming and "must be not a little ashamed of that 
which furnishes the entertainment" (Williams. p. 167). 
Fiction which "sophisticates ••• with false views of moral-
ity" seems to be that which is based on wrong assumptions 
about human nature. so that its representations would cause, 
not emulation of evil. but despair or presumption. Swift, for 
instance, depicts man as an animal, an idea which "if admit-
ted, would justify or palliate the worst vices" (Williams, 
pp. 163-4). The "speculative error" of Robert Bage's ration-
alist "political and philosophical tenets" (Williams, p. 141) 
--not his sexual explicitness45_-draws Scott's heaviest fire 
in this regard. It is tempting to dismiss the Tory's criti-
cism of an egalitarian democrat. Scott clearly expresses his 
scorn for Bage's political propagandizing, especially for his 
belief "that revolutions were to be effected. and states gov-
erned, by a proper succession of clever pamphlets" (Williams, 
p. 139). But this is a mere symptom of the real evil--Bage's 
unreasonable rationalism. Applied to the observation of so-
ciety, this leads Bage into factual accuracy: "[t]he very 
vices and foibles of the higher classes in modern times are of 
a kind different from what Bage has frequently represented 
them" (Williams, p. 141). It also makes him mistake the role 
of women in society (Williams, p. 142). At root of both lies 
an exclusive reliance on individual reason: 
Hermpsprong, whom he produces as the ideal perfec-
tion of humanity, is paraded as a man who, freed 
from all the nurse and all the priest has taught, 
steps forward on his path. without any religious 
or political restraint. as one who derives his own 
rules of conduct from his own breast, and avoids 
or resists all temptations of evil passions, be-
cause his reason teaches him that they are attended 
with evil consequences. (Williams. p. 142) 
Scott demands, "But did such a man ever exist?" (Williams, 
p. 142) How can his author imagine that one may cast off all 
habits gained in nurture? Are not the ancient philosophers 
(and Fielding's Mr. Square) instructive demonstrations of the 
ethical inefficacy of the rule of right reason? and how does 
Hermsprong differ from the religious fanatic who. "referring 
his course of conduct to the action of some supposed internal 
inspiration. conceives himself ••• incapable of crime. even when 
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he is in the very act of committing it" (Williams, p. 143)7 
We sometimes think of a priori reason as the method of the 
Enlightenment, and of appeals to tradition and the individual 
as Romantic. These categories, if they work at all, do not 
work for Scott, whose respect for past experience and the ex-
of the individual is in the tradition of the British 
Enlightenment, being founded upon reason as a means to free, 
wide-ranging but self-aware investigation. Bage would select 
his facts and ignore the limits of reason in the face of man's 
passions on the one hand and the complexities of his social 
institutions on the other; therefore, his doctrinaire ration-
alism is a "sophistry" (Williams, p. 144). Readers who as 
they read accept the author's "postulates" and 
adapt themselves to his "mode" of treating his subject, will 
acquire a brief practice in wrong thinking from Bage. 
Still Scott is only annoyed, not frightened. His calmness 
in the face of immoral literature provoked Lockhart, reviewing 
The Lives the Novelists, who noted Scott's confidence in 
the value of novels and concluded triumphantly that "if they 
may be thus powerful for good, we fear it follows, as an un-
avoidable consequence, that they may be equally powerful for 
evil."1t6 Not necessarily. Romances may prompt generous emo-
tions, and novels "may sometimes instruct the youthful mind by 
real of life," but their primary function is "mere 
elegence and amusement" (Williams, p. 54). This view does not 
denigrate fiction unfairly. If even in ethics observation and 
deduction our knowledge, then the representations of 
novels must compete with real life for the reader's belief. 1t7 
He will learn from what he can bring into his own deductive 
categories, and will discard the anomalous and incongruous. 
Thus the moral value of books depends partly on the reader's 
associations: 
Robinson Crusoe produces the same impression upon 
an adventurous spirit which the Book of Martyrs 
would do on a young devotee, or the Newgate Calendar 
upon an acolyte of Bridewell ••.• (Williams, p. 183) 
Readers of Swift will find the Houyhnhnms and Yahoos too 
"gross and improbable" and inconsistent to believe--unless 
they already share Swift's "gloomy misanthropy" (Williams, 
p. 164). Skillful technique effects little, for 
men are aware that every case may be argued on 
both sides, and seldom render their assent to any 
proposition merely on account of the skill with 
which it is advocated, or the art and humor with 
which it is illustrated. (Williams, p. 139) 
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The Novelist's Library preserved works based on principles 
which "if acted upon, would introduce vice into society" 
(Williams, p. 144); all because the "Editor ..• was never one of 
those who think that a good cause can suffer much by free dis-
cussion" (Williams, p. 139). This idea too we recognize as a 
legacy of the Enlightenment, perhaps its greatest--the rea-
soned defense of freedom. 
Although we have insisted that Scott's critical thought is 
coherent, it is of course used exclusively in specific read-
ings and literary history. Indeed, it renounces the attempt 
to dictate with general descriptions, supposedly exhaustive 
taxonomies or defenses which assign goals to the genre, and 
insists only that the fiction writer's methods be consistent 
with his own primary goals. Scott's theory made possible the 
freedom, versatility and good nature of his practical criti-
cism because it allowed explicitly for sympathetic attention 
to the aims of different kinds of works--it welcomes new de-
partures, whether or not their final tendencies for the genre 
are apparent, it distinguishes literary effects within works 
and treats them differently, and it shields works from demands 
they cannot meet. This pioneering approach was thus singular-
ly adapted to encourage the flourishing young novel, and in 
the modifications (and occasional perversions) of liberal 
criticism it continued to serve the mature form. A searching 
inspection of the original framework may be useful now that 
new sources of elaboration and qualification have become 
available, to see if it can help prop an aging genre. 
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